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'statist/corporate', in contrast to 'globalisation from below' that provides a 'counterweight' to such actors (Falk 2004: 83) .
The notion of 'globalisation from below' is closely related to the substantial body of literature that has developed since the end of the Cold War on the development of transnational and global civil society (Baker 2002: 120) . Authors on this subject have been reluctant to provide a clear definition of global civil society, describing it as a 'fuzzy and contested concept' (Anheier et al. 2001: 11) . For-profit actors and political parties in power have tended to be excluded from present-day understandings of civil society (Edwards 2009: 28) . It is common to argue that global civil society is 'an unfinished project', involving nongovernmental actors and networks across national boundaries that 'tend to pluralise power and problematise violence; consequently their "peaceful" or "civil" effects are felt everywhere' (Keane 2003: 8) . Central to much of the literature on transnational and global civil society has been an emphasis on a process 'that is "bottom-up" rather than "top-down" and that involves the struggle for emancipatory goals' (Kaldor 2003: 142) . It has been common to turn to civic activism in the global South as 'indicative of something moving in different societies across the globe towards a new vitality of "bottom-up" movement in civil society as a counterweight to the hegemonic power structure and ideology', in contrast to 'top-down' NGOs based in the global North (Cox 1999: 13) .
The WSF has been interpreted as the key exemplar of 'bottom-up' approaches and 'globalisation from below'. Smith, for instance, draws a distinction between 'global policy arenas' that 'are...dominated by government and corporate actors' and the WSF process which is viewed as 'an example of how social movements and their allies work to generate alternatives to government-led initiatives for world order' (Smith 2008: 199, 206) . Others, 4 however, have viewed the development of the WSF as indicating 'globalisation from the middle' (Waterman 2004: 87) , given the 'NGOisation of the WSF' (Santos 2006: 70) .
In both cases, the traditional account of the emergence of the WSF emphasises its roots in social movement activism. It is now common in the literature on the development of international relations in the post-Cold War era to refer to the 'activist origins of the WSF' (Halliday 2010: 128) . It is claimed, for instance, that 'the Zapatistas were certainly a primary force in bringing about the development of the World Social Forum' (Shor 2010: 24) . The WSF is also commonly presented 'as heir to the wave of resistance against corporate globalisation that burst on to the public radar screen during the protests against the World Trade Organisation in Seattle in 1999' (Juris 2006: 208) .
The counter-demonstration to the 1999 Davos meeting of the World Economic Forum (WEF) by organisations including ATTAC (Association pour la Taxation des Transactions pour l'Aide aux Citoyens) and MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra)
has been described as 'the start of the movement to create a "parallel summit" to the hidden, elitist and technocratic managers of globalisation symbolised by Davos where they got together with their own "organic intellectuals"' (Munck 2007: 83) . The first World Social Forum in 2001 has therefore been viewed as 'largely an "anti-Davos" people's assembly' (Smith 2008: 209) . One of the founders of the forum, the Israel-born Brazilian businessman Oded Grajew, has described his initial ambition for the World Social Forum as 'to have a space to make people who have the same vision to be together and to join forces, sphere, a space of encounter, deliberation' (Chesters 2004: 332) . 5 While there has been a consensus around the role of these ideas in the conception of the WSF, responsibility for initiating the Forum has been a source of tension among those who have claimed to be among the founders, especially between Grajew and Bernard Cassen, the French leader of ATTAC. Cassen's (2003) (Gautney 2009: 209) . The role of Brazilian actors such as these, combined with the chosen location for the first World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, is thought to have helped ensure that the formation of the WSF resonated 'with a strong trajectory of social mobilisation' and may be interpreted as representative of 'globalisation from below' (Perera 2003: 76) . In the most advanced exploration of the role of Brazilian actors in the development of the World Social Forum to 6 date, von Bülow (forthcoming: 21) shows the importance of the international links Brazilian civil society actors had developed in the preceding years in ensuring that the Forum had significant international participation from the outset.
This article challenges not only the globalist narrative of the WSF's origins which sidelines the significant influence of local Brazilian structures but also the localist account which highlights popular and civil society actors in Brazil, as neither pays sufficient attention to the intricacies of the close relations between business, party political, regional and later national governmental, and social actors, which were central to the origins and early years of the WSF. Through its analysis of the role of these relations in the origins and early years of the WSF, this article will show how the traditional perspective of the WSF as embodying a counter-hegemonic 'globalisation from below' emanating from grassroots actors counterbalancing an 'above' dominated by business and governmental actors, does not provide an adequate picture. In doing so, this article will reveal how the wider literature on transnational and global civil society needs to move beyond simplistic assumptions which divide the world between 'top-down' NGOs based in the global North, and 'bottom-up' social movements in the global South (Baker 2002; Anheier et al. 2001) . Whereas existing work on social movements and civil society organisations has endeavoured to isolate these actors from the business sector and political parties, this article reveals the extensive relations among these sectors even in one of the most paradigmatic examples of transnational social mobilisation.
While it cannot be claimed that the origins of the WSF represented 'globalisation from above' in the traditional sense of being driven by Northern-hemisphere businesses and governmental actors, and although the role of social movement actors must be acknowledged, this article will explore the limitations of considering the hemisphere origins of the WSF to be 'globalisation from below'. In particular, this article aims to challenge existing narratives by highlighting that (i) in its immediate origins the WSF is closely rooted in the corporate movement for social responsibility in Brazil rather than simply in anti-capitalist social movements, and (ii) these roots were supported by the close collaborative relations among elements of Brazilian business and the political and civil elites promoted by the PT, which developed at the regional level in Brazil prior to the creation of the Forum and which accentuated with the Party's ascent to the presidency in 2003.
The element that binds together these two propositions, and a commonly overlooked feature in existing literature, is the personal and ideological connections that the Brazilian corporate social responsibility movement had with the PT -which was to go on to support moderate business-friendly stances during its first two administrations -and the role that these links played in the organisation and consolidation of the WSF in its first years.
These connections have historical roots that placed both groups, the Brazilian corporate social responsibility movement and the PT and its popular allies, as part of the progressive movements that accompanied the 'controlled' democratisation of the 1980s, as rising political actors in the 1990s, and as governmental associates with the ascent of the PT to power in 2003.
Moreover, this article considers that the origins of the WSF and the role played by this corporate group in it were favourably shaped by the transformation of the PT from an anti-systemic social movement party -born from the convergence of the new labour movement, popular-base groups, grassroots Catholic organisations, and clandestine leftwing militants -to a party of government advancing a 'social neoliberal' agenda, where state-led social policies are supported by neoliberal economic policies (Singer 2009; de Oliveira 2006; Rollember Mollo and Saad-Filho 2006; Morais and Saad-Filho 2005; Samuels 2004b). 8 Although the moderation of the PT's socialist and social movement project has been amply studied (Ribeiro 2008; Hunter 2007; Samuels 2004a; Marques and Mendes 2006; Paiva 2006; Panizza 2005) , the implications this moderation had for the WSF have been rarely engaged in the literature. Santos Elias (forthcoming) emphasises the dilemma the WSF project presented for the PT in the early 2000s, given its dual identity as a social movement representative and as a competitor in electoral politics, and shows the prevalence of the latter. This article, on the other hand, goes further by exploring the combined role played by this dual identity of the PT and its co-evolving relationship with the corporate actors significant in the creation and early development of WSF. In this regard, this article provides a missing element that goes beyond both the most recent studies of the WSF's evolution in Brazil, and the wider literature on civil society and social movements, which has commonly attempted to isolate examination of the third sector from the work of political parties and of business (Edwards 2009: 28) . As this article will show, the close relationship between business and the PT in the origins of the World Social Forum constrained from the outset the functioning of the Forum, which developed as an arena for discussion rather than a mechanism for the advancement of more radical alternatives to neoliberal globalisation. This article is based upon a broad range of primary source material on the Brazilian dimension of the origins of the WSF, including interviews with WSF participants and other civil society actors in Brazil (both published and in-person interviews), as well as primary documents and publications of institutions involved in the development of the WSF, and a diverse array of local press articles. The material consulted was not restricted to those directly involved in the WSF process in Brazil, but also related to those involved in other civil society organs in Brazil.
The Brazilian origins of the WSF: civil, corporate and partisan
While it must be noted that the roots of the WSF cannot be attributed to a single individual, Oded Grajew was, as the next section of this article will show, central to the Forum's establishment. Existing accounts of the origins of the WSF tend to neglect how, in Grajew's words, the idea for the WSF came to him only after he had 'tried for some time to introduce social responsibility in the World Economic Forum' (Paget-Clarke 2004) and following his efforts to reform rather than to challenge the WEF, stating at the time that the Forum was not against Davos but that 'Davos is against Porto Alegre' (Toledo 2001) by not opening up to society. These proposals were discussed directly with the leader of WEF, Klaus Schwab, with whom Grajew had personal acquaintance given that the successful toy firm he founded in the 1970s, Grow Jogos, was 25% owned by a German firm represented by Schwab's brother (Grajew 2005) .
The background of Grajew illuminates the complexity of the Brazilian context leading to the origins of the WSF, its relevance, and its contrast with the global narratives outlined at the start of this article. Grajew was well known in the country before the creation of the WSF on account of two factors: (i) he was among the leaders of the business sector supportive of the PT, and (ii) he was one of the most outspoken advocates for corporate social responsibility. Beyond his personal role, it is through the confluence of these two cleavages, and the political structures underlying them, that the WSF became a feasible project.
In particular, the fundamental difference between the corporate social responsibility movement in Brazil and that in the US and Europe, is the ideological and institutional association with diverse social and political personalities involved in the democratisation movement. This connection, rather than reducing it to an exclusively business programme, positioned certain elements of the corporate responsibility discourse as a legitimate civil agenda to be shared by a number of popular actors, which explains the capacity that Grajew and others displayed in mobilising key social actors despite their business roots. This was possible because an eclectic range of social, corporate and political relations existed previously in Brazil and became 'activated' in the organisation of the first WSF.
These relations largely stem from the context from where they originated. Prior the 1970s the centrality of the state in the industrialisation and institutionalisation of the country is said to have shaped 'the most full blown system of corporatism in Latin America' (Collier and Collier 1991: 128) .
1 However, the gradual democratisation process in the late 1970s and 1980s implied the transformation of authoritarian corporatist structures into more open arrangements accompanying the activation of multiple new political actors (Collier 1995; Keck 1992; Collier and Collier 1991; O'Donnell 1977) . Central among these new actors was the PT, founded formally in 1980, with a project of reversing the authoritarian and monopolistic organisation of Brazilian state-society relations and economy until that point, and providing an institutional representation to previously excluded sectors of society (PT 1980; PT 1979) .
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The PT aimed to provide a voice to a diverse array of social sectors, with its multiple However, these experiences in political office also contributed towards the moderation of the PT's political programme. Francisco 'Chico' Whitaker, one of the cofounders of the WSF, Catholic activist, and the majority leader of the PT in the São Paulo
Municipal Chamber in the early 1990s, considered that prior to these experiences the PT had a very elementary vision of government and a poor opinion of political alliances with other groups (Gonçalves Couto 1994) . But the experience of having to run large cities and states started to differentiate governing PT members, who adopted an administrative approach to politics -the idea that it is possible to 'govern for everyone' -from nongoverning party leaders that considered that the PT should 'govern everyone' from a workers' perspective (Gonçalves Couto 1994: 156; Macaulay 1996) . This importance of the first group grew along with the PT's electoral success, reinforced by the impact this had on the Party's finances: Ribeiro (2008) shows that by mid-1990s the PT's budget consisted The presidency of Lula catalysed the moderation of the PT, accentuating a dual model that supported both social policies and economic neoliberalism at the same time, coinciding with the moment the PT started to pass resources to the WSF in greater quantities. This approach by PT 'in government' was defined by its ability to 'build a correlation between economic objectives and political objectives, guaranteeing the circularity of public policies that would rely on the economic to promote the social' (Bianchi 24 and Braga 2005: 1745-62). To do so, the government combined compensatory policies and often clientelist practices, such as the co-optation of leaders of civil society, social movements and labour groups into the state bureaucracy. As previously indicated, the Brazilian democratic system had inclined towards inclusive mechanisms already in the 1990s, leading some observers to consider that it had shaped a form of 'council democracy' (Alvarez 1997; Friedman and Hochstetler 2002) . Nonetheless, the Lula administration A gigantic operation was put together involving the direction of the WSF, the federal, state and municipal governments, the Military Policy, the CUT and the MST. In the Gigantinho Gym, where the act was going to take place at 9.00 am, the gates were opened covertly three hours before, for thousands of people brought by the CUT and MST wearing shirts with the slogan "100% Lula". In this way they occupied almost all the space of the gym, leaving few 
Conclusion
This article does not simply challenge the conventional account of the origins of the WSF predominantly in anti-capitalist social movements: by revealing the complex relations underlying its origins, this article has made explicit the constraining influence exercised by a certain Brazilian faction linking the WSF process with the PT and elements of business.
These complex multi-sectoral relations help us to understand why the World Social Forum 30 developed from the outset as a forum for discussion, rather than as a mechanism for the advancement of more radical alternatives to neoliberal globalisation.
This article also challenges the conventional critique of the WSF which claims that it has rejected its supposedly radical roots and descended into an NGO 'trade fair', as it has been shown not only that this moderation was present from the Forum's inception, given the common approach shared by the corporate, civil and party political actors promoting the project, but that the involvement of these organised actors was fundamental for the Forum's consolidation.
The prevalence of moderate stances inside the WSF responds in large part to the ideological and institutional relationship developed locally between the progressive wing of business and certain sectors of civil society, supported by the (re-)positioning of the PT in the last two decades from a programmatic party to a pragmatic one as it gained higher political offices (Hunter 2007) . The impact this conjunction of actors had in the early evolution of the WSF renders highly questionable the notion that the WSF stemmed purely 'from below'.
For these reasons, this article has contributed towards a more sophisticated understanding of the WSF as a complex political project influenced by and articulating different sectoral and national interests: it is not merely an expression of an alternative global civil society or of the opposition of the South to Northern hegemony, nor it can be said to be spearheading an anti-capitalist rebellion. Rather, by exploring the particularity of the Brazilian institutional relations crossing the WSF, the article has argued that a dyadic 'above versus bottom' view of the origins and early development of the WSF, as well as an 'hegemony versus counter-hegemony' or a 'society versus business' one, not only simplifies the historical and ideological complexity of Brazilian politics, and international politics more generally, but also reproduces a liberal stereotype that frames 'the South' as the home of plural grassroots movements, independent civil society and counter-hegemonic political projects -a characterisation all too common in existing work on global civil society.
This framing ends up performing the conservative function it intends to rejectlocking certain actors and regions in certain roles -while missing the structures enabling an undoubtedly novel space such as the WSF to materialise in the first place. Shedding light on these complex social arrangements, whereby social roles, interests and ideologies do not reflect the competitive social relations presumed by liberal pluralism has the potential to provide insights into other contexts beyond Brazil and to other projects beyond the WSF.
Furthermore, the article demonstrates that the overlapping of roles is not necessarily a defect, as novel and politically-enabling alternatives can emerge and prosper from a set of institutional arrangements which may be assumed to be regressive. Some elements in the WSF have been undoubtedly part of the struggle for a fairer economic system, for a more egalitarian society and/or more responsible business, but at the same time there are party politics, ideological struggles, corporate interests, and Brazilian geopolitical ambitions.
Hence, this article highlights how attributing ontological reality to analytical distinctions can be both problematic and reductive even in what may be considered to be the most emblematic of cases. The evidence of the WSF process indicates that the temptation to consider the development of 'globalisation from below' and of global civil society from the 'bottom up' without due consideration of the role of elites in the business sector, political parties, and regional and national government must be avoided.
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1 Corporatism is defined as a system of state-group relations where the state encourages the formation of a limited number of officially recognised, non-competing, state-supervised groups, shaping a non-pluralistic system of representation (Schmitter 1974 ).
2 Interestingly, in 1994 the then leader of IBASE, the Brazilian sociologist and activist Betinho, was asked to support the candidacy of Lula in that year's presidential race, which ended in defeat. Betinho refused citing the PT's statist tendencies and preferring an independent and radical civil activism. The person who asked for this support was Grajew (Pandolfi and Heymann 2005: 215) . 3 Grajew and his allies were expelled from the organisation, where some occupied relevant positions, as they were considered a faction rejecting the centralised structure (Bianchi 2001 ).
4 Ribeiro (2008: 277) states that certain estimates counted 1,400 PT members in the federal government alone, over 200 in the states and nearly 900 in municipalities, with the opposition claiming figures of around 20,000 people in total.
5 As de Oliveira (2006: 12) characterised it 'notorious businessmen -in their capacity as "representatives of civil society" -were awarded ministries appropriate to their areas of interest and export ranking'. 6 The first author conducted interviews at this conference in September 2011. The literature has observed how Lula maintained the many of the market-friendly policies started at the end of the nineties by Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Cardoso and Gindin 2009; Sola 2008) . 7 In July 2002 this group launched a public manifesto supporting Lula's campaign claiming that he represented '...the only alternative to implement a government programme inclined towards economic growth with employment generation, reduction of inequalities, strengthening of the domestic market and support to national firms' (Scinocca 2006; Folha Online 2002) .
